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(The Pardoning Power, continuedfrom page 11)

strained construction of the general powers
of the President." 21

3. Effect of Pardon
As for the effect and operation of a pardon,
Justice Field stated in Ex parte Garland:
"A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights; it
makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity."
The wide scope of the pardoning power
again was emphasized by the Court in Ex parte
Grossman. 9 In that case, the Court held that
the power could be exercised not only with respect to indicatable crimes but criminal contempts of court. Chief Justice Taft stated:
"The Executive can reprieve or pardon all
offenses after their commission, either before trial, during trial, or after trial, by individuals, or by classes, conditionally or
absolutely, and this without modification or
regulation by Congress."20
As for the claim that successive pardons of
constantly recurring contempts in a litigation
might deprive a court of power to enforce its
orders, Chief Justice Taft stated:
". . Exceptional cases like this, if to be
imagined at all, would suggest a resort to
impeachment rather than to a narrow and
19267 U.S. 87 (1925).
at 120. A few years before, in UnitedStates v.

ZO Id.

Burdick, 211 Fed. 492, 493 (S.D. N.Y. 1914), Judge

Learned Hand observed: "I have no doubt whatever
that the President may pardon those who have never
been convicted. The English precedents are especially

pertinent."

In several decisions rendered between 1856
and 1890 the Court also made clear that the
pardoning power incouded the power to remit
fines, penalties and forfeitures; to commute
sentences; to grant amnesty to specified classes
or groups; and to pardon conditionally or absolutely."2 However, certain limitations on the
power were noted. As the Court stated in
Knote v. US.:
"... It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender in his person by
imprisonment, forced labor, or otherwise; it
does not give compensation for what has
been done or suffered, nor does it impose
upon the government any obligation to give
it... Neither does the pardon affect any
rights which have vested in others directly
by the execution of the judgment for the
offense, or which have been acquired by,
others whilst that judgment was in
force ...However large, therefore, may be
the power of pardon possessed by the President, and however extended may be its application, there is this limit to it, as there is
to all his powers, it cannot touch moneys in
the Treasury of the United States, except
expressly authorized by Act of Congress.
The Constitution places this restriction upon
the pardoning power."?3
In this connection, the Supreme Court's decisionin Carlesiv. New York is of interest. 4 There,
the Courtheld that a state court was not precluded
from considering a prior federal connection and
pardon in assessing the punishment for a subsequent state crime. In the Court's view, according second offender treatment to a defendant
did not impose additional punishment for the
past offense.
Another effect of a pardon is to take away
from the recipient the privilege against self21

Id. at 121.
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Illinois Central R.R. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92

(1890); Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. 154

(1871); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1869);Ex
parte William Wells, 18 How. 307 (1865).
23

24

95 U.S. 149 (1877).

233 U.S. 51 (1914).
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the acceptance of a
pardon constitutes an admission
of guilt by the recipient is not
clear."

iswhether

incrimination with respect to the pardoned offenses. The Court stated in Brown v. Walker:
"It is almost a necessary corollary of the
above proposition that if the witness has already received a pardon, he can no longer set
up his privilege, since he stands with respect
to such offense as if it had never been committed. ' 5
4. Acceptance of a Pardon
In United States v. Wilson, Marshall stated:
"A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which,
delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered;
and if it be rejected, we have discovered no
26
power in a court to force it on him."
The need for acceptance of a pardon was
again emphasized by the Court in Burdick v.
United States, where a witness in a grand jury
proceeding refused to accept a pardon and instead asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court, relying on United States27v.
Wilson, held that acceptance was essential.
Consequently, the witness' refusal to accept did
not destroy the privilege. But in Biddle v.
Perovich, where the Court gave a different emphasis to the pardoning power, a presidential
commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment was held effective without an inmate's consent.2 8 Although Perovich can be
25

161 U.S. 591, 598-99 (1896) See Boyd v. United

States, 142 U.S. 450, 453-54 (1892). Of course, the
privilege would be available if there were signficant
risk of prosecution under state law. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
M 7 Pet. at 161.
27 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
28 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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viewed as casting doubt on the need for acceptance of an unconditional pardon, it has been
noted that:
"... Whether these words sound the death
knell of the acceptance doctrine is perhaps
doubtful. They seem clearly to indicate that
by substantiating a commutation order for a
deed of pardon, a President can always have
his way in such matters, provided the substituted penalty is authorized by law and does
not in common understanding exceed the
original penalty." 9
5.Admission of Guilt
Whether the acceptance of a pardon constitutes an admission of guilt by the recipient is
not clear. In support of the view that it does is
the Court's dictum in Burdick v. United States:
"This brings us to the difference between
legislative immunity and a pardon. They are
substantial. The latter carries an imputation
of guilt; acceptance a confession of it. The
former has no such imputation or confession. It is tantamount to the silence of the
witness. It is noncommittal. It is the unobtrusive act of the law given protection
against a sinister use of his testimony, not
like a pardon, requiring him to confess his
guilt in order to avoid a conviction of it."'30
In the lower court decision, Judge Learned
Hand stated:
"It is suggested that a pardon may not issue
where the person pardoned has not at least
admitted his crime. I need not consider this,
9 The Constitution of the United States of
America: Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 39,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 457 (1964).

because every one agrees, I believe, that if
accepted the acceptance is at least admission
enough. It is an admission that the grantee
thinks it useful to him, which can only be in
case he is in possible jeopardy, and hardly
leaves him in position thereafter to assert its
invalidity for lack of admission."31
On the other side of the issue is reasoning
which equates a pardon and an amnesty.3 Said
one writer:
"Amnesty may be pleaded by a defendant as
a defense to possible criminal prosecution.
One is led to ask: Why does the mere acquisition of an additional defense, which
renders further inquiry needless, necessarily
33
import guilt and exclude innocence?",
In addition, it has been argued that an acceptance of a pardon only may be to avoid the
expense, trauma and other side effects of a
criminal proceeding so that its acceptance is not
inconsistent with a position of innocence.3
6. Fraudin the Granting
Although in his Commentaries Blackstone
30
31
3

236 U.S. at 94.
211 Fed. 492, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. at 153, where the

indicated that at the common law a pardon
could be set aside for fraud, a different view has
been expressed by Chief Justice Taft:
"It has been suggested to me that if the
man had been guilty of fraud in inducing me
to pardon him, I might have set aside the
pardon as void and directed the arrest of the
former convict. I do not think that in such a
case a pardon could be set aside. I do not
think either I or a court would have had the
authority to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the man and to restore him to prison. It
seems to me it would be like a case of a man
acquitted by a jury which was bribed by
him. He might be thereafter convicted of
bribery, but he could not be convicted of
the crime of which the verdict of the jury
acquitted him." 35
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that the pardoning provision, as many other provisions of the Constitution, has not received more attention by
scholars and writers. It is hoped that the recent
interest in the subject occasioned by the pardon
of Richard Nixon will lead to studies of the
provision by the Congress and Bar with a view
to developing acceptable guidelines for its exercise in our system of justice.

Court stated: "the distinction between them is one
rather of philological interest than of legal importance."
33 Letter to Editor from Harry Cohen,
Journal, October 4, 1974, p. 4.
34

N.Y. Law

See Humbert, supra, note 1, at 77 and n. 91a.

3
William Howard Taft, "Our Chief Magistrate and
His Powers", 123-24 (1916).
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